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Privacy is easy for librarians to appreciate until the discovery that other library 
interests—like information access; personalization of services; new services; security 
of people, places and data; and even variations on privacy itself—can compete with 
privacy. During the late 20th century, librarians and United States’ culture embraced 
the idea of reader privacy and particularly privacy of library use, but the 21st century 
has introduced many new privacy challenges. Librarians now face novel privacy 
implications as we consider how to make the most of new technologies and practices 
such as digitization of special collections, data mining of our collection use patterns, 
and any number of social approaches to scholarly communications. We also have an 
abundance of new privacy challenges relating to user information and digitized 
materials containing personal information, as well as a number of privacy obligations 
not unique to libraries such as website privacy policies, data security, and employee 
privacy. The tradeoffs required to protect library-related privacy are becoming more 
costly, and the choices are increasingly complicated by an evolving set of federal and 
state privacy laws and shifting policy norms which librarians must master and even 
help to shape.  
This chapter is offered as support for librarians who must lead libraries through 
this fraught territory where privacy and other values collide. Privacy choices involve 
law, policy, and practical concerns, and each of these three considerations is subject 
to change due largely to rapidly developing technologies and perhaps slightly less 
rapidly evolving cultural norms. Librarians and especially academic law library 
directors are charged with taking a long view of managing a library’s collection and 
services, so this chapter provides a broad overview of the complex areas of related 
privacy law and policy to provide some guidance with more lasting utility than an 
examination of the many specific privacy-related challenges facing libraries at the 
time of this writing. The chapter begins with a brief history and current context for 
libraries and privacy and then identifies some approaches to addressing privacy, 
drawing on a sample of issues relating to privacy of library users, of individuals 
represented in library collections, and of library employees. 
1 Anne Klinefelter thanks Deborah Gerhardt, Dave Hansen, Woody Hartzog, and Michelle Wu for 
their astute and generous insights and Daniel Parisi for his outstanding research support. 
396 Academic Law Library Director Perspectives. Part IV: Developing Issues 
Libraries’ Mixed History with Privacy (of Library Users) 
Libraries’ greatest connection with privacy has been with protecting the confiden-
tiality of library use, but United States libraries did not always have a clear commit-
ment to reader privacy and the related concepts of reader autonomy and unfettered 
intellectual freedom to explore ideas. Historically, libraries have not only shaped 
what was acceptable to read through careful collection management, but libraries 
have also collected information about who reads what and even exposed or actively 
shared those records of library users’ reading habits. United States’ university 
libraries in the 19th century and early 20th century maintained circulation registry 
books that preserved for any curious researcher the names of library users and the 
dates when they borrowed and returned particular titles from the collection.2 Public 
libraries built with Carnegie funds were imbued with twin goals of moral uplift and a 
sort of bootstrap financial betterment of society, and librarians guided library users to 
books deemed by the institution as best serving these goals.3 Privacy-related concepts 
of autonomy, dignity, agency, liberty, intellectual freedom, and anonymity were not 
major conceptual influences on libraries, or even in society, until the latter part of the 
20th century.4  
The idea that libraries and their staff would treat library use as confidential 
needed both cultural and technological supports to develop. The earliest formal rec-
ognition that library use should be confidential may have been the American Library 
Association’s 1939 Code of Ethics which stated “it is the librarian’s obligation to 
treat as confidential any private information obtained through contact with library 
patrons.”5 Whether “private information” referred to by the 1939 Code was intended 
to include book titles consulted is not clear from the text. Signature cards filed in 
book pockets or viewable circulation registry books would have revealed who had 
read a particular book.6  
2 ARTHUR E. BOSTWICK, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LIBRARY 42–43 (1917) (describes “the ledger 
system” as still in use at the time). For an example of this sort of ledger, see Univ. of N.C. at 
Chapel Hill Library Circulation Dep’t, Records of the Circulation Department, 1886–1944. The 
catalog record is available at: http://search.lib.unc.edu/search?R=UNCb2449992.  
3 Andrew Carnegie explained his philanthropic interest in building public libraries were based in 
appreciation for his own boyhood access to a library he said inspired his achievements both moral 
and material. Abigail A. Van Slyck, Free to All: Carnegie Libraries & American Culture, 1890–
1920, at 9 (1995). Perhaps we can call this library culture one that promoted hoisting oneself by 
one’s own bookstrap.  
4 See Anita Allen, Is Privacy Now Possible? A Brief History of an Obsession, 68 SOC. RES. 301 
(2001). 
5 INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM MANUAL 21 (American Library Association Office for Intellectual 
Freedom ed., 8th ed. 2010).  
6 ARTHUR E. BOSTWICK, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LIBRARY 42–46 (1910) (describing “book cards” 
with the title of the book and a record of the persons who took out the book and the dates of 
withdrawal). “When the book is on the shelf the book card is kept in it….” Id. at 44. A gripping 
detailed narrative on early “charging machines” developed and used in the 1930s through the mid-
1950s makes no mention of any considerations of privacy of the library book borrowers. Helen T. 
Geer, Charging Machines, 5 LIBR. TRENDS 244 (1956). 
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The 1960s and 1970s were a time of great social change empowering individu-
als, and the privacy-related concepts of autonomy, agency, and dignity gained influ-
ence throughout society.7 At the same time, technologies such as photocopiers and 
computers changed the way libraries could be used and managed.8 Individuals could 
make copies of parts of library materials instead of checking them out, and computer-
based circulation systems began to replace signature cards that had blatantly shared 
the names and handwriting of individuals checking out library books.9 Of course, 
computerized circulation systems simply presented a different way that library use 
might be tracked, recorded, and shared.  
Disgust over government surveillance relating to Watergate and the Civil Rights 
movement combined with fears of government’s misuse of a growing number of 
databases led to the passage of both freedom-of-information laws and some excep-
tions to those laws to protect the privacy of individuals represented in these data-
bases.10 Library privacy probably received a responsive boost when university 
librarians reported the federal government was attempting to spy on library users 
suspected of exporting scientific and other information during the Cold War.11 
Against this backdrop of social and technological change, throughout the 1970s and 
into the 1980s, state legislatures began to pass laws that protected the confidentiality 
of library use. State laws and some federal laws protecting library use vary, but they 
all provide some protection against access to records of individuals’ use of public 
libraries, publicly accessible libraries, and even private libraries.12  
As the 21st century began, reader privacy and libraries were again in the news as 
librarians rushed to oppose expanded government surveillance under the USA 
PATRIOT Act and related federal laws.13 A case involving federal access to library 
7 See ALEXANDER TSESIS, WE SHALL OVERCOME: A HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE LAW 
(2008); ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967) (articulating and promoting the value of 
privacy).  
8 Henry Tseng, The Ethical Aspects of Photocopying As They Pertain to the Library, the User and 
the Owner of Copyright, 72 LAW LIBR. J. 86 (1979) (suggesting ethical approaches for balancing 
the interests of librarians, teachers, and publishers in adjusting to the disruptive technology of the 
photocopier machine); Howard Fosdick, The Microcomputer Revolution, 105 LIBR. J. 1467 (1980) 
(chronicling the development of the microcomputer and predicting that libraries will have many 
uses for them). 
9 See JEFFREY M. WILHITE, A CHRONOLOGY OF LIBRARIANSHIP, 1960–2000 (2009).  
10 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a (2012).
11 HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, SURVEILLANCE IN THE STACKS: THE FBI’S LIBRARY AWARENESS 
PROGRAM (1991).
12 The American Library Association maintains a webpage with state statutes and state attorney
general opinions protecting confidentiality of library use. See State Privacy Laws Regarding
Confidentiality of Library Use, http://www.ala.org/advocacy/privacyconfidentiality/privacy/state
privacy. Federal regulations protect the confidentiality of use of the Law Library of Congress. 36
C.F.R. § 703.5 (13) (protecting reader records and use records).
13 Susan Nevelow Mart, Protecting the Lady from Toledo: Post-USA PATRIOT Act Electronic
Surveillance at the Library, 96 LAW LIB. J. 449 (2004); Anne Klinefelter, When to Research Is to
Reveal: The Growing Threat to Attorney and Client Confidentiality from Online Tracking, 16 VA. 
J.L. & TECH. 1 (2011).
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use records was instrumental in securing modest but important limitations on these 
laws, particularly as they relate to First Amendment activities.14 In addition, lawsuits 
challenging Google Books on copyright and antitrust grounds inspired a number of 
amicus briefs from privacy advocates contrasting the reader privacy provided by 
libraries with reader tracking practices of Google.15 Librarians’ ethical commitment 
to confidentiality of library use and state library privacy laws have created a strong 
reputation for libraries as havens for confidential reading,16 but the issues to be 
outlined in this article demonstrate that confidentiality of library use in the 21st 
century library is a difficult goal for libraries to meet without frustrating other library 
goals and innovations.  
Legal and Policy Foundations for Reader Privacy 
Reader privacy and the related idea of confidentiality of library use are asserted on 
the basis of an interweaving of law and policy considerations. Reader privacy has 
been justified as essential in serving many First Amendment principles relating to 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Scholars and courts have promoted 
unimpeded expression and access to information as necessary for an informed 
electorate, innovation, liberty, and other values fundamental to the United States.17 
Librarians and others have asserted that when reading is monitored, individuals are 
less willing to explore controversial ideas or reveal interests that would convey 
vulnerabilities like illness or marital discord or which might expose sexual interests.18 
14 USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-178, 
§ 5, 120 Stat. 278, 281 (2006) (Privacy Protections for Library Patrons, amending 18 U.S. C. 2709
to exempt some libraries services from national security letter coverage); see Alison Leigh Cowan,
Four Librarians Finally Break Silence in Records Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2006), http://www.
nytimes.com/2006/05/31/nyregion/31library.html (explaining how librarians challenged a national
security letter and its nondisclosure requirements); see also Ryan Singel, FBI Targets Internet
Archive with Secret ‘National Security Letter’, Loses, Wired (May 7, 2008), http://www.wired.
com/2008/05/internet-archiv/ (describing Brewster Kahle’s settlement with the FBI after Kahle
challenged a request for a particular reader’s records).
15 Klinefelter, supra note 12.
16 Neil M. Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J. 689, 708–09 (2013) (“we need
intellectual privacy to make up our minds, but we often need the assistance and recommendations
of others as part of this process, be they friends, librarians, or search engines. The norms of
librarians suggest one successful and proven solution to this paradox”).
17 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico (Pico III), 457 U.S. 853, 866–67 (1982) (plurality opinion); Julie E. Cohen,
A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28
CONN. L. REV. 981, 1003–19 (1996) (examining First Amendment support for a right to read
anonymously); James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1, 58
(2007) (noting that search engine results may be protected as speech); Sudhir Aggarwal, Zhenhai
Duan, Faye Jones & Wayne Liu, Trust-Based Internet Accountability: Requirements and Legal
Ramifications, 13 J. INTERNET L. 3 (2010) (noting the potential First Amendment problems with a
government actor taking retribution in the form of network access restrictions against a user for
violations of network use policy).
18 Michael Zimmer, Librarians’ Attitudes Regarding Information and Internet Privacy, 84 LIBR. 
Q. 123, 125–26 (2014) (expressing the idea that the freedom to read and receive information
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Some have argued that freedom of the press requires unimpeded readers to make the 
work of the press meaningful.19 More broadly, Constitutional privacy rights have 
been described as protecting certain types of decisions from government interference 
and to prevent disclosure of personal information.20 Privacy interests are generally 
considered to be at the core of several parts of the Bill of Rights, including the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments. Federal constitutional protections for reader privacy are 
bolstered or even broadened in some states by state constitutional protections for 
privacy or freedom of speech.21 State statutes specifically protecting confidentiality 
of library use cover forty-eight states, and Attorney General opinions fill in for the 
other two states. The District of Columbia has similar statutory protection, and a 
federal statute provides confidentiality for the use of the Library of Congress.22  
cannot survive with library use monitoring and the disclosure of such records without permission); 
Alan Rubel, Claims to Privacy and the Distributed Value Rule, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 921, 929 
(2007) (discussing the possibility that privacy allows room for ideas to develop in a democracy); 
Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy: Rethinking Civil Liberties in the Digital Age (forthcoming 
2015) (exploring the relationship between freedom of speech and privacy and asserting the 
importance of intellectual privacy in supporting exploration of ideas before those ideas are fully 
shaped and ready for broad sharing). The writers’ group, PEN, has reported that members are self-
censoring their social media, telephone, email, and other communications as a result of 2013 
revelations that the United States government has been conducting extensive surveillance, Chilling 
Effects: NSA Surveillance Drives U.S. Writers to Self-Censor, PEN American Center (Nov. 12, 
2013), available at http://www.pen.org/sites/default/files/2014-08-01_Full%20Report_Chilling 
%20Effects%20w%20Color%20cover-UPDATED.pdf. 
19 Susan Nevelow Mart, The Right to Receive Information, 95 LAW LIBR. J. 175, 180 (2003) 
(examining the development of the right to receive information as a necessary corollary of the 
right of free speech); see also Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) 
(finding that certain provisions of the Communications Decency Act, which were meant to protect 
children, unconstitutionally repressed the right of adults to receive information). 
20 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600 (1977) (summarizing prior precedent as involving “at 
least two different kinds of interests” including “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
person matters” and “independence in making certain kinds of important decisions”); NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that the state of Alabama could not 
require the NAACP to divulge the names and addresses of its members because it would infringe 
upon the freedom of these individuals to associate); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 
U.S. 297 (1972) (requiring warrants for domestic surveillance in order to protect rights of speech 
and privacy that encourage private political dissent).  
21 Some state privacy rights are explicit while others are derived from other language in the text of 
the state constitution. See Tattered Cover v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo. 2002) (holding 
that Colorado’s constitutional right to freedom of speech was broader than the federal right and 
included the right to purchase books anonymously); see also Privacy Rights Based on State 
Constitutional Provisions, 16B Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 654 (Westlaw, updated May 
2014).  
22 D.C. Code § 39-108 (2014); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 125-19 (2014); 36 C.F.R. § 703.5 (2014) (exemp-
ting Library of Congress reader records from disclosure); see also State Privacy Laws Regarding 
Library Records, Am. Library Assoc., http://www.ala.org/advocacy/privacyconfidentiality/ 
privacy/stateprivacy (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (providing links to the state statutes covering the 
confidentiality of library records). 
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Other laws might also be relevant to reader privacy or library user privacy. The 
Family Educational Rights and Advocacy Act, FERPA, can provide additional 
protection to students’ library records which are likely to qualify as education records 
under the statute and so overlap with state library privacy laws.23 Federal and state 
consumer protection laws may also apply, particularly if a library fails to live up to 
any promises to keep library use confidential.24 California and a few other states have 
specific laws that require website privacy policies if California residents are targets 
for the site, and California now requires notice of the use of website cookies.25 And, 
no matter what promises may or may not have been made by a library, if certain 
sensitive information like Social Security Numbers are left vulnerable to third parties, 
state data security breach notification laws may apply.26 Privacy torts currently have 
narrow and therefore limited viability in general, but they could have some 
applicability to libraries, particularly if the older tort of breach of confidentiality 
takes on renewed vigor.27  
Policies within library professional associations justify reader privacy both as an 
interpretation of Constitutional protections and as an important transcendent value 
akin to a human right. The American Library Association has tied reader privacy to 
intellectual freedom, sometimes defined as an individual’s liberty to choose what she 
wants to read.28 When reading is monitored, the assertion is that individuals’ reading 
is restricted by the chilling effect of that surveillance.  
Another law and policy related justification for reader privacy has particular 
impact on law libraries. Law librarians arguably have additional reader privacy 
responsibilities because we provide access to the law and to law-related materials—
23 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A–B) (2012) 
(defining “education records”). 
24 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act provides authority for the FTC to 
investigate and bring suits against institutions engaging in trade for “unfair or deception trade 
practices.” Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). States also have 
similar laws, and some, like North Carolina, provide for private rights of action. N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§§ 75-1.1, -16 (2014).
25 California’s Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22575–
22579 (2014); see also State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, Nat’l Conference of State
Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/
state-laws-related-to-internet-privacy.aspx#Policies (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (providing a
summary of state laws affecting website privacy policies).
26 Florida Information Protection Act (FIPA) of 2014, Fla. Stat. § 501.171 (2014); see also
Security Breach Notification Laws, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.
org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-
laws.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (providing a 50-state survey of statutes governing security
breach notifications for data breaches of personal information).
27 Daniel Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1805 (2010) (reviewing the
privacy torts and recommending broader applicability).
28 See Mission, Office of Intellectual Freedom, Am. Library Assoc., http://www.ala.org/offices/oif
(last visited Sept. 24, 2014); see generally Alan Rubel, Libraries, Electronic Resources, and
Privacy: The Case for Positive Intellectual Freedom, 84 LIBR. Q. 183 (2014) (examining the rela-
tionship between intellectual freedom and privacy and what the view of intellectual freedom as
autonomy demands of librarians).
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content often considered core to First Amendment speech protections, and research 
that could be subject to attorney-client confidentiality interests.29 The American 
Association of Law Libraries (AALL) Ethical Principles Preamble focuses on this 
role of the law library as integral to making “this ideal of democracy a reality.”30 The 
evidentiary privilege protecting client communications can be waived if not treated 
as confidential, and other interests at risk in legal research could be the attorney’s 
work product protection from opposing counsel’s discovery and the broad ethical 
commitments attorneys must uphold for all information relating to representation of a 
client.31  
Law librarians in the United States, through our national professional associa-
tion, have a collective commitment to confidentiality of library use.32 AALL’s Ethi-
cal Principles include that statement, “We uphold a duty to our clientele to develop 
service policies that respect confidentiality and privacy.” The AALL website 
includes a page devoted to “Privacy” that contains advocacy statements and letters to 
government officials regarding legislation and policies that the association identifies 
as threats to privacy from government surveillance and other practices.33 The associ-
ation does not limit advocacy to privacy issues that are exclusive to library use but 
extends its reach to any government practices likely to impact library use.  
Librarians might well question whether reader privacy policy and law are 
grounded in appreciation for a quaint value now overtaken by competing interests. 
The chilling effect of reader monitoring that is often invoked can seem counter to 
general trends that indicate privacy is not actually valued enough to merit continuing 
protection. In particular, the growth of social media suggests that people find benefits 
in sharing personal and even intimate information, and privacy is simply not the 
prevailing cultural norm. So, librarians might well question whether the societal 
benefits of privacy-compromising activities outweigh individual privacy concerns, 
either in the library context or in other contexts.  
Privacy advocates offer a number of responses to such skepticism. First, as a 
Constitutional or human rights matter, individual rights like privacy are considered 
zones of protection for minorities in a majoritarian democracy. While any indivi-
dual’s human or Constitutional rights might not be absolutely unassailable by 
competing majoritarian interests, the role of rights in general can be seen as protec-
29 Klinefelter, supra note 13. 
30 The first paragraph of the Preamble states, “When individuals have ready access to legal 
information, they can participate fully in the affairs of their government. By collecting, organizing, 
preserving, and retrieving legal information, the members of the American Association of Law 
Libraries enable people to make this ideal of democracy a reality.” AALL Ethical Principles, Am. 
Ass’n of Law Libraries (Apr. 5, 1999), http://aallnet.org/main-menu/Leadership-Governance/ 
policies/PublicPolicies/policy-ethics.html. 
31 Klinefelter, supra note 13. 
32 AALL Ethical Principles, supra note 30. 
33 Privacy, Am. Ass’n of Law Libraries, http://www.aallnet.org/main-menu/Advocacy/aallwash/ 
privacy (last visited Sept. 24, 2014). 
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tion against “the tyranny of the majority.”34 Second, privacy law scholar Dan Solove 
suggests that framing privacy as an individual right fails to recognize significant 
societal benefits when individuals have privacy-related protections, especially in a 
democracy.35 Similarly, Anita Allen argues that even though privacy laws may be 
paternalistic, they are necessary for both societal and individual good because 
individuals cannot effectively secure privacy in the marketplace.36 Third, an apparent 
societal trend towards sharing could fail to acknowledge granular privacy choices 
that include selective sharing with particular individuals or groups and self-editing at 
a broader level of comments that are exchanged on social media. And, some have 
documented how users attempt to avoid privacy-compromising terms of service by 
using inaccurate personal information to sign up for accounts.37 Theories of contex-
tual privacy and of practical obscurity articulate the reality that individuals believe 
that they can share selectively rather than making dichotomous choices between 
making their actions or information either public or private.38 Fourth, some studies 
and success of new start-ups are showing that people are indeed very interested in 
privacy. For example, a study of Google search terms pre- and post-Snowden revela-
tions of United States government surveillance practices indicates that some sensitive 
topics were avoided as news of search monitoring was widely reported.39 Social 
34 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop 
trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835) (warning against the “tyranny of the majority”). 
35 Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 745, 760–64 (2007) (discussing the social value of privacy, beyond thinking of 
privacy solely in terms of value to the individual). 
36 ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? (2011) (examining when the 
law should and should not mandate privacy, drawing on such examples as non-nudity laws and 
insider trading laws to suggest that society should not allow individuals to reject privacy in some 
situations because of the negative impact on society). 
37 Lee Rainie et al., Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online, Pew Research Ctr. 4 (Sept. 5, 2013), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/05/anonymity-privacy-and-security-online/ (providing results 
of a survey showing that 18% of adults say that they have used a fake name and 13% have given 
inaccurate information to maintain online anonymity); see also Danah Boyd & Alice E. Marwick, 
Social Privacy in Networked Publics: Teens’ Attitudes, Practices, and Strategies 19–24 (presented 
at Oxford Internet Inst., A Decade in Internet Time: Symposium on the Dynamics of the Internet 
and Soc’y 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1925128 
(describing alternate privacy strategies for social networks including toggling account activation 
and using “social steganography” or hiding information in plain sight through obscurity). For an 
historical examination of both positive and negative uses of anonymous speech, thereby, shedding 
light on today’s anonymous online speech, see generally Victoria Smith Ekstrand, The Many 
Masks of Anon: Anonymity as Cultural Practice and Reflections in Case Law, 18 J. TECH. L. & 
POL’Y 1 (2013).  
38 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF
SOCIAL LIFE (2009) (describing social norms of selective sharing of information); Woodrow 
Hartzog & Fredric Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2013) (advoca-
ting legal recognition of the privacy value of systems design and system choices that limit access 
to information and thereby achieve a level of privacy). 
39 Alex Marthews & Catherine Tucker, Government Surveillance and Internet Search Behavior 27 
(Digital Forth & MIT, Working Paper, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2412564 (finding that increased awareness of U.S. government surveillance has 
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media have taken these concerns to heart, with Safari Internet browser software 
shifting its default search engine to DuckDuckGo, a service that markets itself as a 
privacy-protecting search option. Further, a number of new applications and tools 
like the Blackphone have been introduced and are reportedly thriving.40 The efforts 
of larger social media companies to distinguish their own tracking of individuals with 
government surveillance demonstrate that these businesses recognize that users value 
privacy and might avoid their services in light of these concerns.41 Fifth, much 
privacy law and policy is based on fundamental concepts of Notice and Choice, and 
many suggest that apparent disinterest in privacy is more a failure of effective Notice 
and meaningful Choice in the marketplace.42  
The context for privacy as a cultural norm is further complicated by the law and 
policy of government surveillance. Recent Supreme Court opinions suggest that the 
“third party doctrine” of the 1970s may have outlived its acceptability as a way for 
the government to obtain, without a warrant, information that an individual shared 
chilled the use of personally sensitive internet search terms both domestically and internationally); 
see also Daniel Castro, How Much will PRISM Cost the U.S. Cloud Computing Industry?, Info. 
Tech. & Innovation Found 2–3 (2013), available at http://www2.itif.org/2013-cloud-computing-
costs.pdf (estimating that NSA spying may cause U.S. cloud companies to lose $35 billion in 
business to non-U.S. cloud companies by 2016); Chilling Effects, supra note 18 (finding a 
dramatic increase in self-censorship by U.S. writers post-Snowden revelations); Voycee, http:// 
voycee.me/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (providing a history-free social networking experience); 
Steve O’Hear, Voycee Is a Social Network that Eats Itself, Tech Crunch (May 21, 2014), 
http://techcrunch.com/2014/05/21/www-will-eat-itself/ (describing how the Voycee social 
network works). 
40 Will Bourne, The Revolution Will Not Be Monetized, Inc. (July 2014), http://www.inc.com/ 
magazine/201407/ceo-of-wickr-leads-social-media-resistance-movement.html; Dan Costa, 
Blackphone Unveils Super-Secure Smartphone at MWC, PC Mag (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www. 
pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2453964,00.asp; Motherpipe—Because Privacy Matters, Motherpipe, 
https://motherpipe.co.uk/about/why-search-anonymously.php (last visited Sept. 24, 2014). 
41 See Eric Schmidt, How the ‘New Digital Age’ Is Reshaping the World, Inc. Live (Mar. 2014), 
http://www.inc.com/eric-schmidt-jared-cohen/for-data-businesses-depend-on-trust.html 
(distinguishing between governmental and corporate access to an individual’s data by arguing that 
governments have a monopoly on the use of force while privacy laws, marketplace competition, 
and the fear of losing customers’ trust will restrict a corporation’s actions). 
42 Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens: Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee 
on Automated Personal Data Systems, U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare (1973), available at 
https://epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/ (defining the fair information practice principles, which 
would become the standard for information privacy practices in the U.S.); Betsy Isaacson, 
Documentary ‘Terms and Conditions May Apply’ Airs Confrontation with Mark Zuckerberg, 
Huffington Post (July 22, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/22/terms-and-
conditions-zuckerberg_n_3635504.html (reporting on a documentary in which the documentary’s 
director invades the privacy of Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg to prove a point); see also Jan 
Whittington & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Unpacking Privacy’s Price, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1327 (2012) 
(examining the transaction costs for consumers in privacy settings on social networking services); 
Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or “Do Not Track”: Advancing Transparency and 
Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 281 (2012) 
(providing background and discussion of tracking and “Do Not Track”).  
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with a commercial entity or tool such as a smartphone.43 These decisions suggest that 
we may have reached a tipping point in the rush to “get over” privacy. On the other 
hand, surveillance statutes may not see much revision even after the Snowden dis-
closures that the NSA has been conducting sweeping tracking of both foreigners’ and 
citizens’ online and communications activities.44  
Legal and Policy Foundations—Beyond Reader Privacy 
The privacy issues of the 21st century library go beyond reader privacy into new and 
broader territory relating to privacy of individuals represented in our collections and 
into employee privacy. Collection content-related privacy issues in particular are 
uncomfortable territory for librarians unaccustomed to engaging with content in any 
way other than trying to facilitate access. Employee privacy is in some sense new 
territory because the law continues to change to address access to background infor-
mation for candidates as well as current employees, public records laws for public 
institutions, and data security.  
Libraries do not have a strong tradition of advocacy for the privacy of individuals 
represented in publications or electronic resources made available through the 
library. We are mostly all about access, about information wanting to be free, and 
about the value of increasing the marketplace of ideas and especially transparency in 
government. These ideals of robust information access can clash with privacy and 
some other library interests. A sizeable quantity of 20th century library professional 
literature concerns librarians’ struggle to parse distinctions between a professional’s 
discretion in selection of appropriate content for the library collection and censor-
ship.45 Since the mid-20th century, libraries and library associations have developed 
policies and ethical statements that promote access to all points of view, with respect 
for the reader as capable of providing his or her own labels or interpretations of 
content.46 Some librarians are free speech absolutists,47 promoting access to informa-
                                                   
43 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488–93 (2014) (holding that cell phone searches by police 
incident to arrest require a warrant); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that it may be necessary to reexamine the third-party doctrine 
that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists once individual data has been voluntarily shared 
with third-parties). 
44 See Securities Industry Group States Opposition to E-Mail Privacy Bills, 13 PRIVACY & 
SECURITY L. REP. (Bloomberg BNA) 1411 (Aug. 11, 2014) (reporting opposition to pending 
legislation that would increase privacy protection for email); Editorial, A Surveillance Bill That 
Falls Short, N.Y. TIMES (May, 22 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/opinion/a-
surveillance-bill-that-falls-short.html (editorial criticizing pending legislation as not providing 
enough privacy protection). 
45 See Marjorie Fiske, Book Selection and Censorship (1959) (chronicling a variety of practices 
such as labeling controversial books with a donation stamp). For a longer retrospective, see 
LOUISE S. ROBBINS, CENSORSHIP AND THE AMERICAN LIBRARY: THE AMERICAN LIBRARY 
ASSOCIATION’S RESPONSE TO THREATS TO INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM, 1939–1969 (1996). 
46 The American Association of Law Libraries has adopted the American Library Association’s 
Library Bill of Rights. Library Bill of Rights, Am. Ass’n of Law Libraries, http://www.aallnet.org/ 
main-menu/Leadership-Governance/policies/PublicPolicies/policy-bill-of-rights.html (last visited 
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tion as a matter of respect for the individual who can evaluate that information. Other 
librarians and much of First Amendment jurisprudence is based on recognition that 
some impositions on expression and access to information are justified for purposes 
of using copyright to promote innovation, furthering national security and immediate 
safety, limiting obscenity, and even protecting privacy.48 To complicate the First 
Amendment analysis even further, some privacy protections, such as a right to 
receive information anonymously, are actually grounded in freedom of speech.49  
Law libraries that are also publishers take on these roles as special contribu-
tions,50 but most of us have not immersed ourselves in questions of privacy law that 
might restrict publication. We might, however, be asked to help researchers who 
intend to quote heavily from rare or other special collections, and we might have to 
consider how to structure access to donated collections that appear to be covered by 
privacy interests like attorney-client confidentiality.51 In some of these situations the 
law is unclear, and librarians must weigh the policy arguments for and against 
                                                                                                                                      
Sept. 24, 2014); The American Library Association includes intellectual freedom among its 
statement of core values of librarianship, Core Values of Librarianship, Am. Libr. Ass’n., 
http://www.ala.org/advocacy/intfreedom/statementspols/corevalues (last visited Sept. 24, 2014). 
47 The text of the First Amendment does state, “Congress shall make no law abridging the rights of 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press.” Librarian Judith Krug was a touchstone for debate 
about unrestricted access to information for all library users. See Leonard Kniffel, Judith F. Krug 
1940–2009: The Freedom to Read, 40 AM. LIBR. 41 (2009) (reviewing Krug’s career and 
advocacy for unfettered library access to information and quoting a colleague who described Krug 
as “a purist, uncompromising”).  
48 See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, or 
Uneasy Allies?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831 (2010) (copyright); Heidi Kitrosser, Containing 
Unprotected Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 843 (2005) (threats and obscenities); Neil M. Richards, 
Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149 (2005) (data 
privacy).  
49 Tattered Cover, supra note 21 (holding that the right to read books anonymously is critical to 
protecting free speech and protected under the Colorado constitution). 
50 Examples of law libraries with traditions of publishing in legal history include The University of 
Alabama and the University of Texas law libraries. See Occasional Publications, Bounds L. Libr., 
http://www.library.law.ua.edu/special-collections/occasional-publications.php (last visited Sept. 
24, 2014); Publications, U. Tex. Tarlton Law Library Jamail Center for Legal Res., http://tarlton. 
law.utexas.edu/library-services/publications (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).  
51 Anne Klinefelter & Marc C. Laredo, Is Confidentiality Really Forever: Even if the Client Dies 
or Ceases to Exist?, 40 LITIG. 47 (2014) (exploring the problems of libraries receiving donated 
materials presumptively protected by attorney-client privilege long after the death of the person or 
persons with authority to assert the privilege); see Douglas Peddicord et al., A Proposal to Protect 
Privacy of Health Information While Accelerating Comparative Effectiveness Research, 29 
HEALTH AFF. 2082, 2083–84 (2010) (advocating that medical researchers present credentials to be 
given full access to health care records now protected by federal privacy laws and allowed to link 
data sets without legally required redaction to conduct effective research); Joseph L. Saxs, Not So 
Public: Access to Collections, 1 RBM: J. RARE BOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS & CULTURAL HERITAGE 
101 (2000) (noting options for special collections access including sequestration for a period of 
time during which privacy interests presumably fade and excluding access to all but a favored 
group; also providing a nuanced and thorough review of privacy and other interests that argue for 
and against access to materials collected by libraries and others).  
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privacy. We are also not entirely accustomed to thinking about format as a factor that 
transforms content, although we know that improvements in indexing and remote 
access have altered legal research and scholarly communication patterns. In terms of 
privacy, format can transform our traditional open stacks from what has been 
described as “practical obscurity” into easily discovered and data mined content 
when libraries digitize content and post it to the web.  
Privacy and access compromises can raise policy concerns of their own, and 
redaction of digitized content to avoid broad dissemination of information like Social 
Security numbers or credit card numbers or names of rape victims can be seen as 
distorting the content or even creating a false version of that original content. Privacy 
advocates might counter that if the redactions are obvious, the changes to the content 
are at least not secret and satisfy transparency in the redaction itself.52 But, any 
privacy solution that involves compromising access and use of information has 
burdened the utility of that information in some way. Privacy scholars and others talk 
about the loss of utility of data and about how particular uses of data might require 
full access without any transformation of data through redaction or other methods. 
While some privacy advocates suggest that these tradeoffs are not actually necessary, 
others promote privacy risk and competing benefits analyses, or even suggest that 
privacy could hamper a sort of pure science exploration of unfiltered access to 
increasing quantities of big data.53  
The privacy law relating to individuals in library content is immature, except 
when financial harm such as identity theft is a risk. Torts relating to privacy vary 
state by state, and several states have rejected some of these causes of action as 
offensive to rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press, while courts that 
accept these torts nonetheless generally do not find proof of harm.54 State identity-
                                                   
52 For example, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) generally gives any person the right to 
request information from the executive branch agencies of the federal government. FOIA, supra 
note 10. However, information that falls under the exemptions listed in section 552(b) need not be 
disclosed. Id. at § 552(b). Generally, the agency responding to the FOIA request must specify the 
amount of information deleted and the exemption that applied. Id. However, the agency can omit 
such disclosure if such an “indication would harm an interest protected by the exemption … under 
which the deletion is made.” Id. See also Judith A. Weiner & Anne T. Gilliland, Balancing 
Between Two Goods: Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and Ethical 
Compliancy Considerations for Privacy-Sensitive Materials in Health Sciences Archival and 
Historical Special Collections, 99 J. MED. LIB. ASSOC. 15, 20 (2011) (“Researchers should be 
made aware of the types of information that may be missing in redacted records.”) 
53 See infra sections on privacy-by-design and risk and risk/benefits analysis. The sort of pure 
science potential was raised by Christopher Wolf who posed the question of how one might 
evaluate potential benefits of unfettered access to big data if a researcher simply wanted to see 
what emerged from the data, without having any clear expectation at the outset to balance against 
potential privacy harms. Discussion at the Future of Privacy Forum Advisory Board Retreat, 
National Harbor, MD (June 3, 2014).  
54 Hall v. Post, 323 N.C. 259, 268–70 (1988) (refusing to adopt the tort of publication of private 
facts and suggesting that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress could be used 
instead); see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977) (restating the tort of publicity 
given to private life). Six states currently reject the publication of private facts tort: New York, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Nebraska, Montana, and Virginia. Jared A. Wilkerson, Battle for 
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theft laws, though, might apply in situations when Social Security numbers, bank 
account numbers, and other related data elements are made widely available. Federal 
laws regulate access to credit relevant information that can be used to deny credit or 
employment, and even if these laws do not directly apply to libraries who might 
digitize content with this type of information, the laws can inform a library’s sense of 
cultural norms. Similarly, state and federal statutes and court rules relating to redac-
tion of sensitive information in documents made Internet-accessible can serve as 
guidelines to libraries with projects that involve scanning materials that might con-
tain similar data elements.  
Other influential laws include HIPAA, which prevents certain types of health 
care entities from sharing patient data unless 17 specific data elements are redacted 
or some specialized statistical anonymization tool is used, or unless the data is 
accessed by researchers bound by contract and oversight through an institutional 
review board.55 Libraries with health related information might look to HIPAA not as 
binding law but as a policy guide.  
Other laws that might directly apply to libraries or influence policy of libraries 
in terms of collection management include California’s website privacy policy laws 
and the controversial right to be forgotten which is gaining traction in the European 
Union.56 Both state and federal laws prohibiting “unfair or deceptive trade practices” 
can also provide guidance for libraries for upholding promises including promises 
relating to privacy and meeting reasonable standards for data security.57 FERPA 
might be an influence if, for example, older student records not directly covered by 
the statute were offered to the library as part of a special collection or if the library 
had responsibility for managing education records of students. Another federal law 
with some relevance is the Communications Decency Act which frames some 
liability limitations for hosts of Internet content and which might support libraries’ 
                                                                                                                                      
the Disclosure Tort, 49 CAL. W.L. REV. 231, 266–67 (2013). For additional guidance, see Publica-
tion of Private Facts, Digital Media Law Project, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/publication-
private-facts (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (providing summary and state-by-state information on the 
publication of private facts tort). 
55 HIPPA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2) (2014) (listing 17 specific identifiers to be 
removed to de-identify personal health information). 
56 California’s Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22575–
22579 (West 2014) (mandating the posting of a website privacy policy explaining how personally 
identifiable data is collected and shared with third parties and how the website responds to browser 
“do-not-track” settings); Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Gonzalez, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 
(E.C.J. May 13, 2014), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text= 
&docid=152065&page Index=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=270518 
(holding that search engine providers must provide a right to be forgotten to EU citizens). 
57 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act authorizes the FTC to investigate and 
bring actions against some entities and persons for “using unfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). Similar state consumer protection laws 
can provide additional private rights of action. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1.1, -16 (2014). 
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digitization projects, even those in which the library redacts sensitive information to 
meet privacy goals.58 
As this overview of privacy law sources demonstrates, most privacy law in the 
United States is tied to particular industries or to particular government entities or to 
a particular form or scope of publication. Libraries, like other public or private enti-
ties, must continually update their assessment of this body of law, because it changes 
rapidly, and because the law so far has failed to develop clarity on jurisdictional 
boundaries when the Internet is involved.59 Fortunately, a number of excellent pri-
vacy law treatises are updated regularly, and as awareness and interest increase, new 
support for monitoring and evaluation library privacy issues are being developed. 
Some Practical Approaches for Addressing Privacy 
Management of Privacy Is a Moving Target 
The list of privacy challenges facing libraries is growing fast as new information 
technologies, services, practices, and trends develop. Privacy protections and privacy 
invasions are in some contexts a sort of leap-frogging battle of stamina and creativity. 
A number of compromise solutions have proven to be startlingly imperfect, and yet 
many privacy professionals are settling on good-enough solutions. The rest of this 
chapter will identify some approaches for addressing privacy that can help libraries 
to develop their own paths to addressing privacy. Some of these approaches are 
broad managerial and planning tools, while others are specific techniques.  
Incorporation of the Fair Information Practice Principles 
The Fair Information Practice Principles are arguably simply highly influential 
policy, but because they cover some specific privacy approaches, they are included 
here as a practical guide. The FIPPs, as they are often called, were developed under 
                                                   
58 The Communications Decency Act, Section 230, provides safe harbor protection for defamation 
and privacy tort liabilities for content providers who are not publishers of the content. Communi-
cations Decency Act (CDA) of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). However, editing is generally 
allowed without losing immunity if the editing is merely for accuracy or civility and does not 
materially change the content. Publishing the Statements and Content of Others, Digital Media 
Law Project, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/publishing-statements-and-content-others (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2014). Section 230(c)(2)(A) specifically states that no provider shall be held liable 
for “any action taken in good faith to restrict access to … material that the provider … considers to 
be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable ….” 
47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(2)(A) (2012) (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit which has generally 
taken a narrow reading of Section 230(c)(1), states regarding Section 203(c)(2) that “A web host 
that does filter out offensive material is not liable to the censored customer. Removing the risk of 
civil liability may induce web hosts and other informational intermediaries to take more care to 
protect the privacy and sensibilities of third parties.” Chi. Lawyer’s Comm. for Civil Rights Under 
Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F. 3d 666, 669–70 (2008) (second emphasis added) (quoting Doe 
v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (2003)). 
59 Joel Reidenberg et al., Internet Jurisdiction: A Survey of Legal Scholarship Published in English 
and United States Case Law, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1951 (2005), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=691501. 
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the oversight of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1973, when the 
growth of federal agency databases was starting to inspire some anxiety about priva-
cy of individuals in these databases. The FIPPs have been a frame of reference for a 
number of United States laws and serve as a guide when the application of laws is 
underdeveloped or simply unclear.60 These principles are: 
 There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems whose very existence 
is secret.  
 There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him 
is in a record and how it is used.  
 There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him 
obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes 
without his consent.  
 There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of 
identifiable information about him.  
 Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of iden-
tifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use 
and must take reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of the data.61  
These principles provide ways for librarians to frame discussions about and 
approaches to addressing privacy. For example, the first principle, on notice, would 
suggest that libraries should provide some mechanism for alerting library users about 
any data collected about them during the course of their use of library services and 
resources. Privacy policies posted to websites are a common vehicle for notice, 
though debates rage about whether policies should be simple or thorough.62 The 
notice-and-choice model for privacy is much criticized as inadequate for many 
reasons, but it remains the foundational principle for much of privacy law and policy, 
especially in the United States.  
                                                   
60 Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on Automated Pers. Data Sys., U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & 
Welfare, Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens 41–42 (1973), available at http://babel. 
hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015005687986;view=1up;seq=9 (defining the fair information 
practice principles (FIPPs), which would become the standard for information privacy practices in 
the U.S.). These FIPPs were incorporated into the 1974 federal legislation creating privacy 
protections in federal agency data. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codi-
fied as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012)).  
61 Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on Automated Pers. Data Sys., supra note 60, at 41. 
62 California’s Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22575–
22579 (2014) (requiring the posting of website privacy policies if the website targets any 
California residents and as a practical matter sets the standard for websites with national use); see 
also State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, http://www. 
ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-laws-related-to-internet-
privacy.aspx#Policies (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (providing a summary of state laws affecting 
website privacy policies). See Susan Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online 
Contract? Lessons Learned and Questions Raised by FTC’s Action Against Sears, 8 NW J. TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. 1 (2009) (reviewing the FTC’s finding that Sears’ privacy policy was deceptive 
because notice of surprising amounts of consumer tracking both online and offline was not ade-
quately disclosed in the privacy policy and user license agreement for software provided by Sears.) 
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Privacy by Design 
Another influential privacy concept is that of “privacy by design” which a librarian 
could use as a reminder that privacy should be part of ground-level planning for 
acquisition of a product or development of a service or structure.63 This approach 
was promoted by Ann Cavoukian during her tenure as Information and Privacy 
Commissioner of Ontario. The principles of privacy-by-design have been outlined as: 
1. Proactive, not reactive; preventative, not remedial; 
2. Privacy as the default setting; 
3. Privacy embedded into design; 
4. Full functionality—positive-sum, not zero-sum (multiple, legitimate busi-
ness interests must coexist with privacy; the requirement of tradeoffs as an 
outdated notion); 
5. End-to-end security—full lifecycle protection; 
6. Visibility and transparency; and  
7. Respect for the user—Keep it user-centric.64 
This approach seems abstract and even obvious, but remembering privacy 
during the excitement or stress of securing a new product or service can be difficult. 
For example, when a publisher of e-books denies any service to a library for fear that 
library access controls will not protect the publisher’s return on investment, a 
library’s most persuasive lead negotiating point may not be user privacy. On the 
other hand, when a library develops a way for users to keep track of their past circu-
lation records, the library can decide to make the service an opt-in rather than an opt-
out default. Other possibilities of privacy-by-design could be making sure that 
Internet browsers have defaults that would allow users to see privacy-enhancing 
search options such as DuckDuckGo or Ixquick. Simply including privacy-protecting 
options as easy choices for library users adds a bit of privacy into the design. Any 
number of design choices in the library facility can support privacy, including limit-
ing surveillance cameras and providing places like carrels for research that can be 
shielded from prying eyes. Another common consideration is making a plan for 
securing law faculty members’ permission regarding requests for books they may 
already have checked out. For example, faculty may be comfortable with the library 
identifying them to their law faculty colleagues if they have a book that a colleague is 
seeking. Or, the library might simply develop a plan to play intermediary on moving 
the book along from one to the other. 
                                                   
63 Ann Cavoukian, Operationalizing Privacy by Design: A Guide to Implementing Strong Privacy 
Practices 12 (2012), available at http://www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2013/01/ 
operationalizing-pbd-guide.pdf; Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: 
Recommendations for Businesses and Policymakers, Fed. Trade Comm’n 22–34 (2012), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-
protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
64 See Cavoukian, supra note 63, at 12 (stating “The 7 Foundational Principles of Privacy by 
Design”).  
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The Harvard Library’s Stacklife project incorporated privacy into the design of 
this crowd-sourced indicator of the popularity of particular titles to add value to the 
online catalog services. The library consulted with experts in data anonymization and 
devised several strategies for designing the project to provide a vehicle for informed, 
opt-in consent for library users’ data to be shared and for various ways to mask the 
library use patterns of individuals who did not opt-in. This project was designed to 
build on popular reader advisory trends in social media, but library-use privacy com-
mitments prevented the library from the sort of transparency used when all users of 
these services opt-in to transparency through the terms of the service.65 At the time of 
this writing, the project continues to be labeled as a prototype. 
Privacy Risk Analysis or Privacy Risk/Competing Benefit Analysis 
Another approach to privacy is something librarians do regularly—a risk and benefit 
analysis. The library would evaluate the legal and policy risks for not protecting 
privacy in a particular way and would also assess the likely benefit of compromising 
privacy in pursuit of some competing goal. This assessment is, however, not without 
weaknesses. Both privacy risks and competing benefits are difficult to predict given 
that information uses evolve in unexpected ways.66 Nonetheless, librarians can assess 
the risks and benefits that are predictable. 
This process is especially important in situations where allowing individual 
library users to make discrete choices is not practical. For example, when an inter-
library loan system shares names of individual users with libraries that are not subject 
to the same level of legal protection for library users, the borrowing library may 
evaluate that tradeoff and decide that the risk to users’ privacy is low while the bene-
fits to having staff able to exploit the full range of lending libraries as speedily as 
possible is a better choice. Another solution, however, might be a purchase and over-
night delivery from Amazon, in which the name of the library user is not required, so 
that a new approach can facilitate both efficient library service and patron privacy.  
Privacy Audits (for Privacy and Information Security) 
Privacy audits were heralded by librarians in the years just after passage of the USA 
PATRIOT Act and were promoted as a way to discover all the ways a library might 
                                                   
65 Stacklife is a creation of the Harvard Library Innovation Center. See StackLife, http://stacklife. 
harvard.edu/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014); see also Marc Parry, As Libraries Go Digital, Sharing of 
Data Is at Odds with Tradition of Privacy, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 5, 2012), https:// 
chronicle.com/article/As-Libraries-Go-Digital/135514/ (interviewing law librarian Kim Dulin and 
others involved in Stacklife and related projects and comparing library catalogs with reader 
recommendations through Goodreads, LibraryThing, and Amazon). 
66 Adam Thierer, Privacy Law’s Precautionary Principle Problem, 66 MAINE L. REV. 468, 475–
77 (2014) (noting the Federal Trade Commission’s incorporation of benefit-cost analysis for 
unfairness relating to privacy and warning that benefits of big data innovations often cannot be 
predicted). 
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collect personally identifying information about library users.67 The idea of review-
ing the library’s current information collection and privacy practices, though, is a 
good precursor to updating a privacy policy and privacy practices.68 Privacy audits 
necessarily include data security audits and thorough reviews of staff training 
practices. A thorough review would address library patron privacy as well as library 
employee privacy. The Association of Research Libraries created a SPEC Kit on 
Library Patron Privacy in 2003, but the changes in information technologies makes 
this resource at best a starting point for an audit of privacy risks.  
Refrain from Collecting, Refrain from Storing, Purge 
Libraries have also simply refrained from collecting or retaining sensitive data as a 
way to protect reader privacy. Many ILS systems can be set to disentangle the user 
record from the book record once the book is returned on time.69 Other records are 
more difficult for the library to manage, but the Association of College and Research 
Libraries has provided some guidance on their Tech Blog to help librarians purge 
information from public computers through browser settings and other practices.70 
Law libraries might require public patrons to sign into their systems using some 
identifying information as a way to manage limited resources, but if privacy is part of 
the design of that system, the library might separate the login from personal 
identification and therefore limit any computer tracking of that individual, at least 
through the library’s actions. However, libraries might wish to retain some personally 
identifying data if they determine, using a privacy risk and competing benefits 
analysis, that the data is important for other goals such as protecting library rare 
materials. No one practice will fit every library’s set of contextual factors.  
However, if the library collects certain types of personally identifying informa-
tion, state and other laws might require that certain elements are carefully protected 
from unauthorized access. Social Security numbers are one example, since this 
information has been used as a tool for identity-theft. If the library is considering 
risk, the likelihood that this data would be exposed inappropriately should be evalu-
ated. In fact, since the widespread adoption of state data security breach notification 
laws, many companies have had to provide this type of breach notification, and 
privacy lawyers now increasingly recommend the purchase of insurance to handle 
                                                   
67 Walt Crawford, Time for a Privacy Audit, 34 AM. LIBR. 91 (2003) (urging libraries to review 
their practices and avoid unnecessary collection and retention of personally identifying records of 
library use). 
68 Rachel E. Gordon from Mercer University Law Library provided a helpful poster relating to 
privacy audits at the 2014 American Association of Law Libraries Annual Meeting in San 
Antonio, TX, July 8–12, 2014. Some information is available at http://aallnet.org/conference/ 
education/poster-sessions.html.  
69 See Barbara Swatt Engstrom, Jan Hartley, & Susan Kezele, Evaluating Patron Privacy on Your 
ILS: How to Protect the Confidentiality of Your Patron Information, AALL SPECTRUM, Apr. 
2006, at 4 (providing excellent guidance on how to evaluate options for protecting the confiden-
tiality of library use through the Integrated Library System). 
70 Eric Phettplace, Libraries and Privacy in the Internet Age, ACRL TechConnect Blog (July 24, 
2013), http://acrl.ala.org/techconnect/?p=3519. 
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the cost of these breaches.71 If data, such as Social Security numbers of library users, 
is not collected, the privacy risks are minimized.  
Encryption (Data Security as Support for Privacy) 
Encryption is a way of making data unreadable by another unless that reader has a 
key to decrypt the data. This tool has been the backbone of many security and 
privacy practices to prevent unintended access. State data security breach notification 
laws widely provide exemptions for data that was lost or exposed while being 
encrypted.72 Recent reports of encryption vulnerabilities suggest that this approach is 
not fool-proof, especially when the information is sent over the Internet, but a get-
out-of-notification-free card is hard to pass up.73 And, as many privacy professionals 
are conceding, imperfect solutions may nonetheless provide significant protections 
against all but the most dedicated data attackers.74  
Encryption can play a role in a number of services that the library offers. If the 
library wishes to increase barriers to Internet Service Provider monitoring of infor-
mation a lawyer might email to herself such as results of a library database search, 
the library might be able to offer encrypted email.75 Likewise, the online search of 
the library catalog could be offered in encrypted form. Any employee data that might 
be saved to a laptop or jumpdrive is vulnerable to loss and data security breach, so 
encryption of these devices could be a reasonable approach to managing that risk.  
Training Staff, Other Forms of Data Security as Support for Privacy 
Traditionally, library-use privacy was a matter of training staff and instituting proper 
controls on access to the library’s records and systems, and staff training remains an 
important component of privacy and security in the library. Emerging concerns 
include risks that libraries are sharing patron records with many multi-library systems 
that support other library goals such as backup systems for data, interlibrary loan, and 
                                                   
71 J. Andrew Moss, Enhancing the Brave New World of Cyber Liabilities and Insurance 
Coverage, 42 SPG-Brief 28, 31 (2013) (reviewing the increased occurrence and costs of data 
security breaches and recommending, “A critical piece of a comprehensive breach response plan 
should be insurance”).  
72 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-61(14) (excluding the loss of encrypted data, when the encryption key has 
not been compromised, from the definition of a security breach); see also Security Breach 
Notification Laws, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2014) (providing a 50-state survey of statutes governing security breach notifica-
tions for data breaches of personal information). 
73 See Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, What NSA Surveillance Means to Law Firms, 74 OR. 
STATE BAR BULL. 18 (2014) (advising specific approaches to encryption of data to make the 
practice more effective); Elizabeth Dwoskin, Researchers Use Big Data to Get Around Encryp-
tion, WALL ST. J. BLOG (June 23, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/06/23/researchers-use-
big-data-to-get-around-encryption. 
74 Ann Cavoukian & Khaled El Emam, Dispelling the Myths Surrounding De-identification: 
Anonymization Remains a Strong Tool for Protecting Privacy 1 (2011), available at http://www. 
ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/anonymization.pdf. 
75 Phettplace, supra note 70. 
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consortium arrangements, and for tracking use and users of subscription databases. 
Law school library directors can work with campus library and IT administrators to 
make sure contract terms and practices like destruction of stale records are in order.76 
Parent institutions often have strong policies in place, but librarians might need to 
educate IT and even university counsel on the need to comply with state library 
privacy laws. Sometimes, a scholarly communications librarian can be a terrific inter-
mediary and advocate for improvements in these areas.  
Staff orientation programs should include training for staff members and any 
student workers who have access to circulation, interlibrary loan, and both public and 
staff computers. Law school libraries can generally rely on parent institutions for 
guidelines about employee privacy including public records issues for public institu-
tions. Policies and procedures should outline how staff should respond to requests for 
access to patron and employee information. The Edward Snowden revelations 
suggest that library-specific requests for information have been replaced by govern-
ment programs to gain access to information traffic through Internet and phone 
service providers, but libraries should nonetheless provide staff with clear guidelines. 
Perhaps the most high-profile challenge to the USA PATRIOT Act came from a 
librarian working for a library network.77  
Even old-school simple security is still important. Access to information should 
be limited to staff who need access to perform their jobs; discarded documents with 
sensitive information should be shredded; retired computers should be carefully 
scrubbed of data; and file cabinets (physical or virtual) with employee records and 
Social Security numbers should be locked. These types of security measures are not 
unique to libraries, and so the parent institution may be the best source for librarians 
needing to monitor current reasonable practices.  
Practical Obscurity 
Practical obscurity is an important component in any library’s honest assessment of 
privacy for library users or for privacy of individuals represented in the special col-
lections or scanned content. Few libraries will actively seek to employ practical 
obscurity techniques, but the practical obscurity lens for privacy is likely to be a 
factor and assessing new approaches to providing library services. In most cases, if a 
library is conducting a cost/benefit analysis, the loss of practical obscurity is a 
measure of decreasing privacy protection for which a library should account. 
                                                   
76 See e.g., Jason Rakers, Managing Professional and Personal Sensitive Information, in Proceed-
ings of the 38th Annual ACM SIGUCCS Fall Conference: Navigation and Discovery 9 (2010) 
(outlining best practices for universities in managing sensitive information as established at 
Youngstown State University). 
77 Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006), dismissing appeal from 386 F. Supp. 3d (D. 
Conn. 2005) (granting preliminary injunction against enforcement of gag order provision of the 
PATRIOT Act in case involving the disclosure of library records via a National Security Letter); 
see also Andrew E. Neiland, National Security Letters and the Amended Patriot Act, 92 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1201, 1220–24 (2007) (providing details of the case and the leak to the New York Times 
that rendered the case moot). 
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Librarians might decide to introduce some new form of privacy protection to balance 
the loss of practical obscurity. 
For example, library users enter many libraries without having to identify 
themselves, and although their presence in the library is observable by others visiting 
the library, social norms and other practical realities come together to provide barri-
ers to surveillance that make the visit somewhat confidential. Disruptive technolo-
gies, though, can weaken this type of practical obscurity, and libraries might need to 
consider how to address the new realities of library security surveillance cameras, 
library patrons’ use of smartphones with video capabilities and ease of posting to 
social media, and the introduction of other technologies such as face recognition 
technology. Librarians could balance the loss of practical obscurity by positioning 
security cameras so that they do not record details of information sought in the 
library and by introducing new policies prohibiting video recording of people in the 
library without their permission. 
Practical obscurity applies to privacy protection for individuals represented in 
traditional library collections as well. Although libraries proudly offer open stacks, 
laudably available to the general public, newer, disruptive technologies can remove 
traditional barriers to access such as travel to the library during hours the facility is 
open and finding and perhaps paying for parking. Although libraries proudly offer 
online catalogs freely searchable through the Internet, a scanned, keyword searchable 
set of special collection documents discoverable through general search engines 
removes barriers of selecting a specific OPAC and knowing how to search a biblio-
graphic record rather than a full-text document. Librarians have pointed out the 
privacy reducing role of Internet access to full-text documents as compared with 
traditional “public access” to a library stacks collection and have articulated 
balancing activities such as redaction of identity-theft enabling data.78 The privacy 
protecting role of practical obscurity has some grounding in the law and has been 
promoted by scholars as a way for the law to match individuals’ expectations.79  
                                                   
78 Tammy A. Hinderman, State Law Library Gets A 21st Century Makeover: How to Use the New 
Research Tools, 32 MONT. LAW. 6 (2006) (describing how the library’s digitization of court briefs 
was interrupted by the realization that with the loss of practical obscurity, the library was 
facilitating identity theft with the posting of briefs and attachments that contained information such 
as Social Security Numbers, and describing the library’s decision to remove some content and 
redact others from the scanned material); see also David S. Byrne, Access to Online Local 
Government Records: The Privacy Paradox, 29 LEGAL REF. SERV. Q. 1 (2010) (describing the 
loss of practical obscurity in the context of access to court records through visits to the courthouse 
compared with free access through the Internet.)  
79 U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,780 
(1989) (holding that disclosure of FBI rap sheet through Freedom of Information Act could 
constitute unwarranted invasion of personal privacy because it collected information previously 
available from different sources and therefore protected by “practical obscurity”); Woodrow 
Hartzog & Fred Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, 88 WASH. L. REV. 385 (2013) (advocating for 
privacy through obscurity by design). See also Amanda Conley, Anupam Datta, Helen Nissen-
baum & Divya Sharma, Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition to Online Court 
Records: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772, 814–24 (2012) (reporting results of 
empirical tests that demonstrated the difficulty of gaining access to public records held by courts in 
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Redacting, or Otherwise Scrubbing Information 
Like encryption, redaction is an imperfect yet useful approach for balancing privacy 
and access to information. While encryption is intended to limit access to authorized 
users of information, redaction is generally used to provide wide access to informa-
tion while removing from view particular parts of a larger set of information. Redac-
tion is a long-used approach that is increasingly the subject of debate due to the 
growing risk of the redacted information being discovered through comparisons of 
redacted data with other publicly or privately available data sets.80 Individuals who 
are presumptively made anonymous through redaction might later be re-identified in 
ways that may not be anticipated at the time of the redaction and release. A number 
of high profile re-identification events have been seen as spoilers of this somewhat 
simplistic if sometimes onerous privacy approach. Netflix released redacted data 
about its users for a competition to develop new services, and researchers were able 
to use outside data to fill back in the missing data, both identifying individuals and 
their movie watching habits and putting Netflix at risk for violating both the Video 
Rental Privacy Protection Act and federal consumer protection laws.81 An AOL 
searcher was re-identified in a similar situation after supposedly anonymized data 
was released.82 Patients were also re-identified after patient/research data were 
supposedly anonymized in accordance with the relatively strict guidelines set out in 
HIPAA regulations.83  
Defenders of redaction suggest that re-identification is actually still quite rare, 
and the benefits of redaction are still strong and largely unmatchable by other 
                                                                                                                                      
contrast with the ease of access and searchability of records posted for free or near-free on the 
Internet). Professor Helen Nissenbaum has pointed out that traditional library print collection 
access is itself a form of practical obscurity, and sadly, she is probably correct. Conversation with 
Helen Nissenbaum, Professor, Media, Culture, and Communications, and Computer Science, New 
York University, Privacy Law Scholars Conference, Berkeley, CA (June 2–3, 2011). 
80 Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: The Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 1701 (2010); see also Arvind Narayanan & Edward W. Felten, No Silver Bullet: De-
identification Still Doesn’t Work (July 9, 2014), available at http://randomwalker.info/ 
publications/no-silver-bullet-de-identification.pdf. 
81 Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of Large Datasets (How to 
Break the Anonymity of the Netflix Prize Dataset) 1 (2008), available at http://arxiv.org/PS_ 
cache/cs/pdf/0610/0610105v2.pdf; Class Action Complaint at 1, Valdez-Marquez v. Netflix, Inc., 
No. 09-05903 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2009), available at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threat 
level/2009/12/doe-v-netflix.pdf.  
82 Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html. 
83 Adam Tanner, Harvard Professor Re-Identifies Anonymous Volunteers in DNA Study, FORBES 
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/2013/04/25/harvard-professor-re-
identifies-anonymous-volunteers-in-dna-study/ (reporting that a Harvard Professor re-identified 
40% of a sample of anonymous patients from the Personal Genome Project); Dan Bowman, OCR: 
No Fail-safe for De-identifying Patient Info, FIERCEHEALTHIT (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www. 
fiercehealthit.com/story/expert-determination-safe-harbor-not-fail-safe-de-identifying-patient-
info/2012-11-29 (reporting on guidance from the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. that no 
method of de-identification is 100% effective). 
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methods.84 Statistical and computational approaches to mining data while protecting 
some privacy interests are in development, and laws like HIPAA acknowledge that 
these approaches might substitute for redaction, but these approaches may not be 
commercially available or cost-effective for libraries in the near future.85  
Libraries might consider redaction in the context of digitization of special col-
lections in order to meet the goals of increased access to the collection while 
reducing the possibility of access to particular pieces of information considered a risk 
for financial harm or dignitary harm. For example, libraries might scan court records 
otherwise unavailable electronically and then redact Social Security and bank 
account numbers before the records are posted freely to the Internet.86 State and fed-
eral court rules for e-filing and state laws for identity-theft and data security breach 
notification laws could serve as law and policy guidelines for such a project.87 Other 
types of data that might be redacted move into dignitary harm, and libraries are likely 
to feel more concerned about making choices in these categories because United 
States law and culture norms are not settled on which types of dignitary harms are 
worthy of protection. However, libraries could look to other professional ethics or 
best practices for guidance, for example, following journalistic ethics and choose to 
redact names of rape victims.88  
                                                   
84 Cavoukian, supra note 74. 
85 Andrew Chin & Anne Klinefelter, Differential Privacy as a Response to the Reidentification 
Threat: The Facebook Advertiser Case Study, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1417 (2012) (reviewing whether 
“differential privacy” techniques of querying big data have been used by Facebook, identifying 
possible other applications, and considering where existing law could recognized this technique as 
satisfying privacy requirements). 
86 Hinderman, supra note 78, at 6 (describing how the library’s digitization of court briefs was 
interrupted by the realization that with the loss of practical obscurity, the library was facilitating 
identity theft with the posting of briefs and attachments that contained information such as Social 
Security Numbers, and describing the library’s decision to remove some content and redact others 
from the scanned material). 
87 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-470 (2014) (restricting the public posting or public display of social 
security numbers); Social Security Number 2010 Legislation, Nat’l Conference of State 
Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/social-security-
number-2010-legislation.aspx (last visited Sept. 25, 2014) (providing a 50-state survey of statutes 
mandating the redaction of social security numbers and other personal information); see also 
Security Breach Notification Laws, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-
laws.aspx#1 (last visited July 24, 2014) (providing a fifty-survey of statutes governing security 
breach notifications for breaches of personal information); Data Disposal Laws, Nat’l Conference 
of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/data-disposal-laws.aspx (last visited July 24, 2014) (providing a 50-state survey of 
statutes regarding the proper disposal of personal information). 
88 Code of Ethics, Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists (1996), available at http://www.spj.org/pdf/ethics 
code.pdf (stating the principle to minimize harm especially in the case of identifying juvenile 
suspects or victims of sex crimes). See also Judith A. Weiner & Anne T. Gilliland, Balancing 
Between Two Goods: Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and Ethical Compli-
ancy Considerations for Privacy-Sensitive Materials in Health Sciences Archival and Historical 
Special Collections, 99 J. MED. LIB. ASSOC. 15, 20 (2011) (advising that redaction and release for 
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The case for redaction of scanned content is one of balancing the loss of practi-
cal obscurity with some other form of privacy protection. Another way of consider-
ing redaction is that it supports to some extent the Fair Information Practice Principle 
of avoiding the surprise of an individual who finds that shared information is later 
used in an unexpected way. Similarly, the theory of contextual privacy, formulated 
by Helen Nissenbaum, might be a lens for considering that litigants expected infor-
mation to be practically accessible to attorneys and parties to the litigation. On the 
other hand, libraries could consider law and policy that argues for transparency in 
court records or for an expiration of privacy interests after a certain period of time 
and decide that redaction is not appropriate for court records. Applicable law is still 
largely underdeveloped, and librarians and others may need to engage in develop-
ment of best practices guidelines.89 
Other library collection scanning projects might involve books no longer in 
copyright. Presumably, publishers have already assessed privacy risks, since the 
books were intended for wide distribution.90 Another scenario in which libraries 
might redact information is in response to a public records request. Libraries that are 
public institutions might redact records provided through public records requests in 
order to prevent identification of particular library users protected by state library 
privacy laws or by FERPA or to comply with state employee privacy laws.91  
Contracting for Privacy 
Contracting for privacy is an important strategy for librarians. Law school libraries 
have transformed in the past decade or more into what John Palfrey has called 
“digital-plus,” meaning we are primarily libraries of electronic resources, and in this 
environment much of the digital content proprietary and managed by intermediaries 
with whom the library would have a contract governing access.92 Data collection and 
analysis of individual readers unimaginable only a few years ago are potentially open 
to technological innovation unless contracts specifically prohibit such practices 
because privacy law and privacy policy are unsettled. Negotiating for privacy, how-
ever, can be difficult because the terminology can be confusing and because 
                                                                                                                                      
broad access can be an option for libraries accepting materials with information considered private 
under HIPAA regulations). 
89 Ariz. R. Civ. P. Super. Ct. R. 5(f) (2014) (setting rules for the proper handling of sensitive data 
defined as Social Security Numbers and financial account numbers in filing of electronic or paper 
records); see also Redaction of Information, N.D. Cal., http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/ecf/ 
redaction (last visited July 8, 2014) (providing an example of common items redacted and 
common errors with electronic redaction).  
90 See James Grimmelman, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 939 (2014) (concluding that 
the Google Books project did not need to incorporate privacy considerations because books 
represent content that was presumably already vetted for privacy concerns by its author and 
publisher both as a policy matter and as a risk of liability under privacy torts like public disclosure 
of private facts, a tort recognized in some states). 
91 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012) (restricting the 
disclosure of student education records). 
92 John Palfrey, Cornerstones of Law Libraries for an Era of Digital-Plus, 102 LAW LIB. J. 171 
(2010). 
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librarians, like many consumers, do not always have a great deal of bargaining 
power.93 Kindle readers, Overdrive e-book systems, LexisNexis, Westlaw, and 
Bloomberg Law all are designed to track individual readers for any number of 
reasons including digital rights management and tailored interfaces. Fortunately, 
providers of legal databases should be familiar with attorneys’ need to protect the 
confidentiality of their research, so while individuals are tracked, contracts should 
specify that no third parties will gain granular access to usage data.94 Nonetheless, 
librarians should be alert to the possibility that their contract with a database provider 
may not prevent the provider from attempting to override user privacy terms through 
an end-user license that governs downloading of a related mobile application or 
personalized access. Overall, the challenges in this area are many and are likely 
expanding.  
Alan Rubel and Mei Zhang reviewed database contracts of university libraries at 
public institutions and found that libraries have room to improve to protect the 
privacy of patrons using these databases, particularly in terms of limiting publishers’ 
sharing of usage data with third parties.95 They also suggest that terms requiring 
libraries to divulge patron information for non-authorized use investigations could 
run afoul of library privacy laws.96  
Any number of technologies used by libraries could include contract terms for 
privacy. Integrated library systems and cloud storage provider contracts should 
probably be reviewed for terms relating to potential mining of the library data, what 
state or country the data is stored, who has access to the data, and how the data is 
secured.97 And, although the warning may seem to veer into the tinfoil hat category 
of privacy anxieties, libraries should also be alert to contracts governing technologies 
that are part of the so-called “Internet of Things” including smartgrid sorts of furni-
ture and lighting.98 
                                                   
93 B. J. Ard, Confidentiality and the Role of Third Parties: Protecting Reader Privacy in the Age of 
Intermediaries, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1, 42–45 (2013) (describing how Amazon emailed indivi-
duals who had checked out Kindle e-books from libraries and suggesting the libraries have little 
bargaining power with Amazon).  
94 Klinefelter, supra note 13. 
95 Alan Rubel & Mei Zhang, Four Facets of Privacy and Intellectual Freedom in Licensing 
Contracts for Electronic Journals, 76 C. & RES. LIBR. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 14–16), 
available at http://crl.acrl.org/content/early/2014/04/29/crl14-599.full.pdf.  
96 Id. 
97 Edward M. Corrado & Heather Lee Moulaison, The Library Cloud Pros and Cons, THE 
DIGITAL SHIFT (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.thedigitalshift.com/2012/03/software/the-library-cloud-
pros-and-cons/. 
98 See Mariam Pera, Libraries and the “Internet of Things:” OCLC Symposium Shows Benefits, 
Raises Questions, AM. LIBS. MAG. BLOG (June 28, 2014), http://www.americanlibrariesmagazine. 
org/blog/libraries-and-internet-things (reporting on presentation by Daniel Obodovski about real-
time machine tracking of humans including library users and related privacy concerns); see also 
Dan Goodin, Crypto Weakness in Smart LED Lightbulbs Exposes Wi-Fi Passwords: More Evi-
dence the Internet of Things Treats Security as an Afterthought, ARS TECHNICA (July 7, 2014), 
http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/07/crypto-weakness-in-smart-led-lightbulbs-exposes-wi-fi-
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Trading Reader Privacy for Content Privacy 
The requirement that a researcher identify himself and the purpose of his research is 
used in a number of regulated contexts, including gaining access to credit informa-
tion and to patient data for medical research purposes.99 This barrier to access bur-
dens the researcher’s privacy but furthers some interests commonly associated with 
privacy for individuals represented in the content.  
Keeping track of who uses library resources is how a library protects its inven-
tory, evaluates return on investment, complies with obligations to restrict subscrip-
tion database access to users authorized under licensing terms, and gains insights that 
can guide marketing of library services and collections. Truly private, anonymous 
use of libraries would interfere with these goals, so libraries work to limit the burdens 
on library user privacy in other ways. But privacy burdens on library users can also 
be used to meet the goal of protecting the privacy of persons whose sensitive infor-
mation is contained in a special collection. When libraries have special collections 
known to contain sensitive information, one approach to limiting access to create an 
application process in which library users must identify themselves and the purpose 
of their research, to limit privacy risks for individuals represented in the content. For 
example, researchers who promise that they will not publish bank account numbers 
that appear in a special collection might be given access to that special collection. 
This approach is sometimes used for management and even as a condition for receipt 
of donated special collections.100  
Extending Privacy Choices to Library Users and  
Educating Users about Privacy 
Librarians generally prefer to let library users make their own choices about their 
reading interests, and most of us would prefer to let them make choices about the 
privacy aspects of that reading as well. The Fair Information Practice Principles are 
grounded in this approach. But, sometimes libraries must make a global choice or a 
default choice on behalf of library users. Notice and Choice model has been 
criticized as untenable since consumers have little way to make informed choices if 
indeed there are choices beyond take-it-or-leave-it.101 
                                                                                                                                      
passwords/ (reporting on white-hat hackers attack against network-connected light bulbs that 
exposes Wi-Fi passwords to anyone in proximity to one of the LED devices). 
99 Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012); Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.); HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. pts. 
160 & 164 (2013); HIPAA Security Rule, 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164 (2013). In some cases, privacy 
is used as an instrumental goal that serves another ultimate goal such as nondiscrimination. See 
Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information Nondiscri-
mination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439 (2010).  
100 Sax, supra note 51 (noting a variety of access options for donated special collections including 
limiting access to an exclusive group).  
101 Anita Allen goes so far as to recommend that privacy be imposed upon individuals to some 
extent in order to protect the societal benefits from privacy. ANITA ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY 
(2011). 
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Nonetheless, libraries can offer some options to its users. The catalog might be 
offered for fast, unencrypted access as well as encrypted searching which might be a 
slower option. A library user might be offered the ability to opt-in to the library’s 
retention of all records of books that person has checked-out. Any number of social 
services, like the posting of library users’ reviews of books in the catalog, might be 
available through an opt-in model like Amazon provides.102 To support library users 
in making these choices, the law library’s website privacy policy might offer both a 
short version and a long version explanation of the implications of these options.  
Libraries might have new value if the growth in tracking and surveillance 
creates more backlash because libraries are positioned to market some services as 
providing a sort of privacy-intermediary between the researcher and online trackers. 
Libraries can play this role through many ways by offering researchers computers 
through which research can be conducted without tracking an individual’s browser or 
cell phone identifier or other technological proxies for a particular person. In effect, 
the library would be highlighting or even creating privacy choices for its users, some 
who may want more privacy for some types of research and less privacy for other 
types of research. 
Library directors might also support efforts to provide broader education about 
privacy or even promote privacy choices.103 Many privacy risks are opaque to library 
users and all consumers, especially in the context of new information technologies 
which appear to deliver services and content for “free” while monetizing consumer 
tracking data. Libraries can and perhaps should play a role in bringing more trans-
parency to debates about appropriate tradeoffs between information privacy and 
competing goals.104 The American Library Association’s Office of Intellectual Free-
dom has chosen to promote privacy through an educational program of “Choose 
Privacy Week” which organizes and supports a variety of events across the country 
                                                   
102 Some librarians have advocated for privacy protections through the installation of self-check-
out stations. A study at Central Michigan University’s Park Library found that circulation of select 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender materials circulated 20% more through self-check than at a 
staffed desk and concluded that patrons appreciated this type of library privacy. Stephanie 
Mathson & Jeffrey Hancks, Privacy Please? A Comparison Between Self-Checkout and Book 
Checkout Desk Circulation Rates for LGBT and Other Books, 4 J. LIBR. ACCESS 27 (2006). 
Because the law addresses many sensitive topics, this self-checkout approach could be a good 
development for law school libraries and might also help with library staffing efficiencies. Of 
course, this 2006 article predates much of the news of extensive tracking through electronic 
systems and widespread government surveillance, so 2014 users might feel differently about a 
choice between a library staff member human eyes and the possibility that an electronic system 
might track them in some more sinister way.  
103 See Adam Theirer, Privacy Law’s Precautionary Principle Problem, 66 MAINE L. REV. 468, 
480–81 (2014) (advocating education as the best approach to encouraging privacy choices and 
privacy products).  
104 See Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Wittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s 
Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606 (2014) (exploring the harms that consumers suffer 
when they are misled by the labeling of services as free rather than services offered in exchange 
for personal information). 
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during the first week of May.105 The international Data Privacy Day, February 28, is 
another galvanizing force that libraries can use as a basis for events relating to 
privacy.106  
Conclusion 
Law library directors are not alone if they feel overwhelmed by the fast-changing 
mysteries of information privacy threats, the vagaries of privacy benefits and risks, 
questions of the worthiness of competing interests, the hit-and-miss nature of privacy 
law, and the uncertain efficacy of particular approaches. Staying informed is a 
constant challenge, and gaining insights into innovations in data collection can to 
inspire either an affinity for tinfoil hats or an impulse to don a wearable computer 
and perhaps nothing else.107 Despite the messiness of the issues, though, privacy is an 
area that law library directors can embrace with true legitimacy. We are experts in 
information management and in the law, and we have a collective commitment to 
privacy that is part of our larger professional brand. Librarians have an opportunity to 
provide leadership for managing information and information privacy within our 
home institutions and beyond.  
Privacy is a topic that can be incorporated into law librarians’ teaching, writing, 
speaking, and advocacy. A few of us teach privacy law courses, and others cover 
aspects of privacy in courses such as cyberspace law, law & computers, advanced 
legal research, or information ethics.108 Conducting research is surely our domain, 
and shaping that research into publications and presentations on privacy topics 
supports reflection and develops expertise. In addition, engagement in national and 
local debate and initiatives relating to privacy can be an important way for law 
library directors and other librarians to provide leadership in this area. We are impor-
tant stakeholders in debates about how to appropriately integrate privacy into the 
evolving information culture because we are trusted to embrace innovation and also 
maintain the long view that emerges from traditions of information collection, access, 
and preservation.  
My hope is that this overview of the law and policy of library privacy and high-
lights of privacy approaches for libraries not only demonstrates the complexity of 
this area but also provides support for librarians who must forge a path in the midst 
of rapid change and competing values. 
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